Barriers

Barriers: Washington 3

1994-1997

IRA gunman patroling in Belfast. (Belfast Telegraph)

"The most difficult obstacle to overcome is the lack of trust. You can rebuild buildings, you can replace vehicles, you can put bridges back up, but the really important thing [is] to change what is in people's heart and minds, takes much longer."
~ George Mitchell (United States Institute of Peace)

Trust played a vital role in commencing the negotiations. Without trust the round table talks would have left out Sinn Fein, a republican political party and was associated with the violence of the IRA, Irish Republican Army. This would have caused more violence. Many parties were afraid of starting negotiations with the IRA and other actively violent groups out of fear. In 1994, the IRA declared a ceasefire; they promised not to use their arms or weapons anymore. 

People celebrating the 1994 IRA ceasefire in Belfast. (Peter Thursfield)

"Recognising the potential of the current situation and in order to enhance the democratic process and underlying our definitive commitment to its success, the leadership of the IRA have decided that as of midnight, August 31, there will be a complete cessation of military operations.​​​​​​​"

~ IRA 1994 Ceasefire Statement (CAIN).

Negotiations and an agreement were thought to be near due to this ceasefire, but unionists and conservatives did not want to start negotiations without ensuring that the ceasefire was permanent. The debate whether to or not to decommission and when it should take place was known as Washington 3. During a speech in Washington in 1995, Sir Patrick Mayhew, a british conservative politician, demanded "the actual decommissioning of some arms" prior to the round-table talks. (CAIN)

US senate majority leader George Mitchell, Canadian General Jean de Chastelain and former Finnish Premier Harri Holkeri came together to find a way around this blockage. They came up with six principles to follow before the beginning of the discussions known as the Mitchell Report or Mitchell Principles. All in all, the most important principle was that paramilitary groups should need to happen during negotiations. 

Taoiseach Albert Reynolds shakes hands with Sinn Féin leader Gerry Adams and SDLP leader John Hume outside Government Buildings after a meeting about how to move forward in the peace process following the IRA’s ceasefire announcement of August 31st, 1994. (BBC)

rgba(199,198,198,0.58)

“It wasn’t the IRA war that brought Sinn Féin success, it was the IRA peace.”

~ John Kelly, former IRA chief of staff in the late 1970s

The IRA and Sinn Féin continued to be denied access to discussions due to noncompliance with the Mitchell Report. Gerry Adams, president of Sinn Féin, finally accepted the Mitchell Report on the condition that the other parties welcomed them. The Northern Ireland Office still refused to invite Sinn Féin to round-table talks with the other parties. After killing another person in a robbery on June 7th, 1996, the IRA and Sinn Féin were again denied entry to the all-party talks, known as the Stormont talks, on June 10th, 1996. The British and Irish governments gave the IRA five weeks to renew its ceasefire and be invited to the Stormont talks once they reconvened. Shortly afterwards, the IRA and Sinn Féin renewed their ceasefire in a joint statement. This trust barrier was broken by the commencing of talks and will continue to be broken in future years. 

The front page of the Irish Times on September 1, 1994. (The Irish Times)